Showing posts with label geometric returns. Show all posts
Showing posts with label geometric returns. Show all posts

Wednesday, 15 April 2026

Annual performance update- year 12

 This is how I started last years update: "Mad out there isn't it? Tarrifs on/off/on/partially off/on... USD/SP500/Gold/US10/Bitcoin all yoyoing like crazy."

Well the orange peril is still at it, and as I write this the global supply of oil has been severly curtailed for several weeks now; with a certain amount of reaction in oil futures (which some of it perhaps supressed since apparently "cash on the nail" prices for physical oil are much higher in some delivery ports), but net-net almost none in US stocks. 

As always I do these updates on the basis of the UK tax year, 6th April to 5th April; and as I did last year I'm going to focus almost entirely on my futures trading.


Overall figures 

My total portfolio performance was 6.4%. Almost all of that is down to futures; without it I would have earned just 0.2%. This is not surprise since my long only portfolio has been very low risk, consisting almost entirely of short term bond futures, after I went 100% cash during the taper tantrum (yes, bad move in retrospect, and another failure of discretionary trading on my part). I did start to selectively buy back into equities in the last month or so. Whilst 6.4% is better than nothing, and better than last year, it pales when compared to my Vanguard 80:20 benchmark which was up 23.7% during the tax year. My plan is to refill my equities portfolio over the next couple of years, hopefully using the short term panics which are helpfully generated by the White House every few weeks.

Everything else in this post just relates to futures.


Futures: Headline numbers

Last year in brackets

MTM:        21.9%   (-17.8%)

Interest:    2.7%   (2.4%)

Fees:       -0.04%  (-0.05%)

Commissions:-0.33%  (-0.29%)

Slippage:   -0.55%  (-0.56%)

Net :       23.7%   (-16.3%)


Well first let's note that it is a positive number, and it's also my best performance since 2022 (when another significant conflict started, and I made 27%). Curiosly this is identical to the 80:20 benchmark, at least to one decimal place, but of course that is a silly comparision and a better benchmark is coming later. 

'Interest' includes dividends on 'cash like' short bond ETFs I hold to make a slightly more efficient use of my cash. MTM - mark to market - also includes gains or losses on FX positions held to meet margin, and on the cash like ETFs. MTM breakdown:

Pure futures:    21.7%

Cash like ETFs:  -0.77%

FX:               1.1%


As I did last year then, let's lump together all the interest, FX and ETF MTM and interest, and call those 'cost/benefit of margin':


Futures MTM: 21.7%   (-14.5%)

Fees:        -0.04%  (-0.05%)

Commissions: -0.33%  (-0.29%)

Slippage:    -0.55%  (-0.56%)


SUBTOTAL - PURE FUTURES: 20.7% (-15.3%)

Cost of margin: 2.9% (-1.0%)

Net :       23.7%  (-16.3%)


Time series


You can see that about half the profits were made quite slowly from June to November; and then the other half made very quickly in December and January (we will return to that later). After that things got quite volatile with the whole war thing happening, and risk is currently quite low.

And for the longer term you can see we are pretty much at the HWM set in April 2024, although I never quite got there:


(Note as for all my plots these are non compounded account curves)


Benchmarks


My two traditional benchmarks are the SG CTA index, and an AHL fund which like me is denominated in GBP. A big thanks to Neils from TTU for sharing his SG data as my previous free source stopped working (SG if you are reading this, come on guys, please share!).

First meaningless raw performance:





                AHL       SG           ROB

Mean       5.6%      4.9%         13.8%

Stdev     10.7%      9.0%         17.3%

SR (rf=0)  0.52      0.54          0.80        


Those Sharpes would be lower, especially in the last couple of years, if a risk free rate was deducted.

My correlation is 0.68 with SG CTA, and 0.56 with AHL. Their joint correlation is 0.79.

Now for vol adjusted:





          AHL   SG     Me

30/03/15 68.4% 51.2% 59.5%

30/03/16 -6.4% -3.7% 28.1%

30/03/17 -3.8% -12.6% 2.4%

30/03/18 9.0% -1.7% 2.0%

30/03/19 5.4% -2.7% 4.5%

30/03/20 22.6% 6.5% 33.8%

30/03/21 0.9% 11.9% -1.7%

30/03/22 -12.4% 33.1% 25.8%

30/03/23 8.3% 0.6% -7.6%

30/03/24 14.9% 24.3% 20.6%

30/04/25 -18.7% -18.0% -15.4%

30/04/26 30.3%  29.9%   25.9%


Note: The reason I'm showing 25.9% here and 23.7% earlier, is that these figures are to the end of the relevant month (i.e. March 31st to March 31st), rather than the UK tax year; as I can only get monthly figures for the AHL fund. I've highlighted in green the best performer in each year, red is the worst. 

I've highlighted in green the best performer in each year, red is the worst. A great performance from AHL; their fund was up 18.1% before vol adjustment and as they run at significantly less vol than me this was fantastic. SG CTA also did very well, with raw performance of 15.3%. As a result I was actually the worse of the three for this year at least. 

The CAGR based on monthly vol adjusted figures are 7.7% (AHL), 8.2% (SG) and 13.0% for me.


Market by market



Here is the asset class story:

==================
P&L by asset class
==================

    codes  pandl
    Bond  -2.84
     Vol   0.00
  Sector   0.39
  OilGas   2.21
      FX   2.24
     Ags   3.89
  Metals   5.49
  Equity   5.49
Market wise, the rogues gallery were CAD10 year bonds, plus a few equity markets (SPI200, DOW, DAX) and the US dollar index. I lost between 1% and 1.2% in each of those. The markets where I made more than 1% are quire varied:
          TOPIX    1.0
           PLAT    1.0
            AEX    1.0
        BITCOIN    1.1
            JPY    1.2
       MSCIEAFA    1.7
         YENEUR    2.0
     BRENT-LAST    2.3
            MIB    2.7
     MSCITAIWAN    3.6
        FEEDCOW    4.0
         SILVER    4.2

Silver in particular was quite famous earlier in the year and shows a classic TF curve (price, position, p&l):

Rather overlooked by the legacy media; Feeder Cattle was one of the nicest runs:



Trading rules


Last year almost none of my trading rules made money, all of which contributed to my worst ever year trading futures with my first double digit loss. 









Overall then a much nicer picture for the divergent rules, with convergent less nice except for skew. The best performing model this year at least was the most traditional, the 'momentum' model which is a bunch of moving average crossovers. This probably explains my relative underperformance this year. Also worth nothing that the slowest trend models did the best in almost all categories.



Costs and slippage


My total slippage (diff between mid market price when I come to place an order, and where I get filled) was 0.55% of my starting capital; and commissions were 0.33%. That's an all in cost of 0.88%, very much in line with last year and previous years. Since I switched to dynamic optimisation, my costs have been extremely consistent.

Without my execution algo, if I had just traded at the market, I would have paid 1.34% in slippage; my simple algo earned 78bp and cut my slippage bill by around 40%. 


Coming up


As I noted above I plan to rebuild my long only portfolio out of the smoking ruins of my cash pile over the next couple of years. I also have some interesting things planned in the research and production space this year; you can find more details here.



Tuesday, 17 March 2026

How to write a tweet that gets over 300k views; and why diversification is probably good

 Well that blew up:

https://x.com/investingidiocy/status/2032438612961165409



At eight words this is almost certainly* my most viewed and liked tweet ever (although I have nearly 25k followers, so thats 18,000 or so that didn't like it) . Short, pithy, funny; I should retire from my Xmaxxing game right now (just kidding; there are still plenty of gamblers, crypto nuts and MAGA idiots waiting patiently to be educated; and I have a million more dad jokes to inflict on the unsuspecting public).

* X doesn't provide statistics to non premium users, but I am pretty sure it's up there

Obviously the point I was making was about diversification. Buying 50 stocks is better than buying 2 or 3 because of said diversification, unless certain - quite challenging - conditions are met (I'll be spending much of this post quantifying exactly what those conditions are). 

Now it was very interesting to read the negative replies (the positive ones were just lovely, thanks). They generally fell into variations of the following:

  • "Something something asymmetry" (which a few kind people explained to me; obviously as a trend follower, ex-professional options trader and occasionally lottery ticket buyer I didn't know there could be such a thing as an asymmetric bet)
  • "You just have to choose the right three stocks". A couple of people were even kind enough to share the list of stocks that will definitely go up in the future.
  • "If you are so smart, why aren't you as rich as Druck?"
  • What the tweet means, but didn't actually say, is: "Yes, you should buy 50 stocks and ensure 2 or 3 of them are home runs"
  • Again what the tweet meant, but didn't say, is: "you should use a Taleb barbell type strategy and build a portfolio mostly consisting of boring stuff; plus a few carefully selected lottery tickets"
  • Also what Druck apparently does, but again wasn't in the tweet, is use stops which means it's fine  and dandy to have concentrated positions.
  • "Risk and reward you idiot". Thank you for kindly explaining the basic premise of modern portfolio theory (MPT) in such a succint way, I weirdly hadn't come across this idea before in over a quarter of a century of studying and researching portfolio optimisation.
  • "Diversification might make sense once you are rich, but not if you are trying to build wealth."

Whilst some of the above points might seem facile to the cognoscenti who are reading this post, several of them actually raise some very interesting points about a core argument in finance: the trade off between skill (if you have enough, then diversification is bad), and luck (if you don't have enough of this, then diversification is always better); as well as the role of risk and access or not to leverage.

Hence this post - the ultimate diversification-good-or-bad post! I'll whizz through quite quickly from 1st principals some stuff that will be familiar to most of you (though definitely new to many of the people who replied above if they are reading this) ; and end up in more novel territory I have been considering a lot lately - the best way of quantifying and comparing uncertain outcomes; which feeds into optimal back testing practice.


Some irrelevant stuff


Let's first dismiss some of the problems above as mostly irrelevant:
  • "Something something asymmetry": All bets in finance are to an extent asymmetric, eithier good (positive skew) or bad (negattive). Arguably long only bets in stocks which have limited downside but unlimited upside fall into this category (though a distribution of stock returns will have fat negative tails for return periods of less than a year; beyond that you get saved by autocorrelation). But an asymmetric diversified portfolio of bets will outperform a non diversified asymmetric portfolio unless certain conditions are bet: asymmetry doesn't affect the basic argument here. Apart from lottery tickets and maybe options (which I don't think Druck uses, and the persistent buying of which will lose you money in the form of paying the variance premium) the degree of asymettry isn't known in advance, so we are left with the problem that unless we can forecast the future to some degree of accuracy diversification is always better.
  • Also what Druck apparently does, but wasn't in the tweet, is use stops which means it's fine to have concentrated positions: Using stops will just add positive skew (asymettry) to strategy returns; plus if assets have trends at the appropriate horizon this will be at no cost or even improve the average return. A diversified portfolio of bets with stops will outperform a non diversified portfolio of bets with stops; so again, this doesn't change the basic question we're trying to answer. As someone whose diversified trend following system with implicit stops trades over 200 assets, I am clearly putting my money where my big mouth is on this one.
  • "If you are so smart, why aren't you as rich as Druck?": Putting aside that Druck isn't actually putting his entire fund into three stocks, as discussed in the many of the replies to the post, my immediate response to this is if Druck is so smart, why isn't he as rich as numerous other people I could mention who do use massive amounts of diversification? One data point doesn't really prove anything. It could just be that he is highly skilled, or very lucky; two explanations I will explore at length in the post proper. 

With that in mind we are left with three interesting arguments to debate:

  • "All" you need to do is pick better stocks; eithier as part of a small concentrated portfolio, a larger one or a barbell setup.
  • More risk means more return
  • Diversification makes more sense once you are rich


Risk 'n' Leverage 

One key point we need to address is whether we are working in an environment with leverage or without it; and if our assets volatility is sufficiently high that will not matter. With leverage diversification will improve returns by more than without.

To explain you first need to know that my favourite formula in finance is that Kelly optimal risk is equal to your Sharpe Ratio; if your SR is 0.5 then your optimal risk is 50%. My next favourite formula, which you can use to derive my first favourite formula, is the Gaussian approximation* for geometric return AKA CAGR: 

m - 0.5s^2 

where m is the arithmetic mean and s is the standard deviation. My third favourite formula is that risk will be reduced by sqrt(N) if you increase the number of assets in your portfolio by N, and all your assets are independent; higher correlations will lead to smaller reductions. As a rule there are diminishing benefits to diversification, as it gets harder to find assets with low correlations, especially if your universe is just US stocks. But there will always be benefits from diversifying as long as correlations never get to 1.

* By the way with positive skew the CAGR will be higher than it is for Gaussian; with the reverse true for negative skew, but to reiterate doesn't change the overall findings we will get.

Let's make some assumptions for now just to illustrate the effect of having more leverage. We have a choice between N=3 assets, and N=3*(4^2) = 48 assets (close enough to fifty). The correlation of those assets is 0.5 (seems reasonable enough for US stocks drawn from multiple sectors, but we'll explore other values later). We also assume we give those assets equal weights. 

From favourite formula number three the maximum reduction in standard deviation will be 4 if they are independent, but they are not so it's more like 1.14 (the ratio of 1.40 and 1.22 which are the improvements from N=1 going to N=48 and N=3 respectively). For example if the standard deviation of each stock is 30%, then it will be 30%/1.22 = 24.5% for a portfolio of 3 stocks and 30%/1.4 = 21.4% for 48 stocks.

Let's also suppose for now we can't predict future Sharpe Ratios, and the expected SR is 0.25 on each asset, and the risk free rate is the current 3.75%. Then each stock will have an excess return of 0.25*30% =  7.5% which equates to a total return of 11.25%. That seems optimistic, but we're just playing with numbers for now.

An unleveraged portfolio of 3 stocks will have an average return of 11.25% and a standard deviation of 24.5%; 48 stocks will come in at 11.25% and 21.4% respectively. The Sharpe Ratios on those should be 1.22*0.25 = 0.306  and 1.4*0.25 = 0.35. Check you get those numbers if you calculate the SR manually.

There is a messy spreadsheet you can play with here: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/12Y06FAxSW6Ii-dDg4TM1H9g-ZBHTUt6mi1a8Htskeuo/edit?usp=sharing Make a copy, do not ask for edit access. This won't allow you to calculate the reduction in risk from diversification, I used python for that. Here is the messy python code: https://gist.github.com/robcarver17/85238b6d538d6e3acedccfc1cc5a76c8

What about a leveraged portfolio? The optimal leverage to run these at will be risk targets of 30.6% and 35.0% for 3 and 48 stocks. Assuming for the moment we are mad enough to do that, we will end up with leverage ratios of 30.6/24.5 = 1.25 and 35/21.4 = 1.64; and after subtracting borrowing costs we get returns of 13.1% and 16.0%, excess returns of 9.37% and 12.2%; and Sharpe Ratios of 0.306 and 0.35 since SR is unaffected by leverage.

Now using my 2nd favourite formula, we can work out the expected geometric returns. They come in at:

- Unleveraged 3 stocks: 8.25%
- Unleveraged 48 stocks: 8.95%

- Leveraged 3 stocks: 8.44%
- Leveraged 48 stocks: 9.87%
 
In simple terms, we can't 'eat' risk reductions in the form of improved annual returns without leverage. But lower risk does improve CAGR by 70bp. With leverage we can convert all of our lower risk into higher returns, and thus boost CAGR even more: by over 140bp.

Note the maths above for unleveraged traders would be better if:

  • The individual assets were riskier; at over 50% the optimal leverage would be below 1 even for 48 stocks and we would improve CAGR 'as if' we had leverage.
  • The per asset Sharpe Ratios were lower; if below 0.15 then the risk target even on the larger portfolio would be sufficiently low that again the optimal leverage would be below 1 even for 48 stocks
The fact that diversification improves CAGR even for unleveraged traders is probably one of the most important yet not widely known results in finance.

Of course the key number in all of the above is the average correlation between stocks; if it's 0.7 then the CAGR improvement falls from 70bp to 42 bp unleveraged; and from 143bp to just 52bp leveraged. A more realistic scenario is if you have a choice between picking three relatively undiversified stocks* and 48, then the larger portfolio will inevitably include several assets that have a higher correlation, bringing your average correlation up, and the diversification benefits down. However it's impossible for the benefit of diversification to go to zero if we assume identical standard deviations and Sharpe Ratios.


Risk 'n' Reward you idiot

You can hopefully already see that the 'you take higher risk therefore you get more reward' without diversification just isn't relevant here. It is true - and a trusim of the efficient frontier in CAPM which assumes constant SR - that you can get an improvement to CAGR by adding riskier assets if you are an unleveraged investor and the SR is sufficiently high that you can put more risk on without going past the optimal Kelly point (if you are leveraged you don't care since you can always achieve your required risk target even if assets have a very low standard deviation). 

But a larger portfolio of riskier assets will still have a higher geometric return than a smaller portfolio of assets with the same risk! 

Basically these people are mixing up the two key kinds of risk in MPT: specific and systematic risk. The choice of the universe of possible assets sets a given risk 'background' systematic level. In certain circumstances you can sometimes but not always improve CAGR by choosing a universe of assets with higher risk. But you can always improve it further by subsequently diversifying your portfolio so you hold more of the universe, and thus reducing your specific risk. 

Taking a higher risk through not diversifying means you are not being rewarded for taking more risk; you only get that reward if you trade riskier assets.



Diversification is only for rich people, take one

You can hopefully also see that the 'diversification is only for rich people' argument also doesn't apply. One of the trusims of financial economics is that rich people should have safer portfolios. In practice that might mean running their portfolio risk at half Kelly rather than full Kelly (where risk target = SR). But changing your risk target, whilst it will for example reduce the benefit from using leverage, doesn't affect the improvements you would get from diversifying!

Eg If I rerun the numbers above with a 50% instrument risk (so leverage doesn't help, simplifying the argument) I get these numbers:

- Unleveraged 3 stocks: 8.44% CAGR with 30.6% risk
- Unleveraged 48 stocks: 9.87% CAGR with 35% risk

It still makes more sense to diversify, even with a higher risk target. 

If I now set the maximum risk target as a rich person trying to protec their wealth at 20%, then the advantage of diversification is diminished but it is still there:

- Unleveraged 3 stocks: 7.87% CAGR
- Unleveraged 48 stocks: 8.75% CAGR

Again the logic is clear: just because a poorer person can take higher risk doesn't mean they shouldn't diversify. Not diversifying means you won't benefit from the CAGR boost that comes from the lower risk that brings. A poor person who can't use leverage should probably invest in a universe of riskier stocks (assuming they don't end up above kelly optimal risk in doing so), but a diversified basket of such stocks will be better than just three.

There are more subtleties with this poor vs rich that we will come on to later in the post.


A first stab at calculating the skill premium required

With the above back of the envelope figures we can work out the skill we would need as stock pickers to overcome. To close the 70bp CAGR gap for an unleveraged investor between N=3 and N=48, with the initial assumption of a correlation of 0.5 and SR=0.25; would require to to lift your SR from 0.25 with 48 assets to 0.2735 with only three assets. That is a SR difference of 2.35bp.

Actually the premium is slightly larger; if you had 45 assets with a SR of 0.2485; and three assets with a SR of 0.2735, then your SR on your three asset portfolio would be 0.2735 and on your 48 asset portfolio it would come out at 0.24. You need to be able to find three assets with a SR that is about 2.5bp higher than the average of your universe. Or to put it in terms more people would understand, you need to find three assets whose expected average annual return is 0.75% higher than the rest of your universe. That doesn't sound that hard. If correlations were 0.7 rather than 0.5; then you just need an advantage of 0.45%.


The role of modelled uncertainty

45bp to 75bp of extra annual returns doesn't sound that hard. But in this exercise so far we've completely ignoring the role of uncertainty. We don't actually know any of the numbers I have thrown about in these formula, except for N of course (assuming we can count to three, and keep counting to 48). In practice standard deviations and correlation estimates are broadly predictable enough we can treat them as forecastable (and it's only really if we are using leverage all the way up to the Kelly optimal that we should care that much about the exact figures). But forecasting Sharpe Ratios is much harder. And that is to ignore the fact that financial returns aren't really drawn from Gaussian distributions with linear correlations. We need to think about the effect all this will have on our results, and we will do so for the rest of the post.

For now though, let us indeed assume that financial returns are drawn from linearly related Gaussian distributions with stable distributions, whose parameters we know. However we can't assume that this will gurantee outperformance from a given portfolio with superior theoretical risk adjusted returns. This is because luck will still play a part in the form of modelled variance. Expected performance will only be achieved in the very long run AND/OR across the average of many possible future outcomes.

This means that for relatively short periods of time (not the long run, as in the long run we're all dead), and/or for conservative points of the expectation of the future, we'd have more of a preference for portfolios that are safer and have less 'sparse' portfolio weights. An example of a sparse portfolio weight is if you have say 48 assets available but decide to only allocate to say three of them because they have a higher expected SR/return. So sparse is just another word for concentrated.

Note: This obviously ties into proper robust portfolio optimisation for backtesting purposes

Sparseness is penalised in the short run because there is more chance of eithier very good or very bad outcomes than with non sparse weights, and thus larger variance between outcomes. For example, suppose you pick only three stocks. There is a risk that you happen to pick three crap stocks, and also a possibility that you pick three amazing ones. That is a much larger dispersion of outcomes than if you have a 48 stock portfolio.

Let's look at a picture:

Each of the grey lines shows the cumulative mean returns over a year for 1000 different bootstraps. The setup here is an average correlation of 0.5, 3 assets, risk free rate 3.75%, per asset SR 0.2735 and per asset standard deviation 30% with no leverage. This would equate to an average arithmetic return of 12.0% (the expected CAGR remember comes out to 8.95%). The black line shows the average across bootstraps, and that indeed comes out roughly where we would expect it (equivalent to a CAGR of 8.6%). But there is huge dispersion. If we convert each of the bootstrap outcomes into a CAGR figure we can get a histogram:


The MEAN of this distribution is 8.65%, which is the same as if we had took the daily mean return across all the distributions and worked out it's CAGR. The median however is much lower, and comes in around 5.35%. The 25% quantile is a loss: -10.8%. 

What if we did the same thing but with 48 assets, whose per instrument SR is just 0.25. We already know that the lower per asset SR exactly balances out the extra diversification, with an expected CAGR of 8.95% the same as before. Here is the histogram:



 The upside is capped, but the downside is also lower. As a result the 25% quantile is better: -9%. 

If I produce much longer time series, then things don't deviate as much. For 20 years of data rather than one, the 25% quantile with three assets is a CAGR of 1.56%. For 48 assets, with the lower per asset SR, it's still higher: 3%.  

Note: you have probably seen this sort of exercise before in bonds vs equities comparisons. If you care about say the 25% quantile then you'd probably prefer a portfolio with more bonds or cash for shorter time periods to avoid the potential bear market in stocks that would happen in any given year; whereas for longer time periods we expect the returns of stocks to be sufficiently high that even at the 25% quantile you'd prefer more stocks.

The TLDR on this section is that a more concentrated portfolio will have more dispersion of results, especially over short periods. So even if your stockpicking talent is enough to overcome the loss of diversification on average; you will need an even bigger advantage to be confident that you'll beat a more diversified portfolio say 3/4 of the time.
 

Diversification is for the rich, take two

Notice that in the histograms above we are capping the upside more with a diversified portfolio. If the two different sized portfolios above had equal per asset SR then the 99% percentile of the two over one year comes in at CAGR of 86% for three assets, and 73.9% for 48. That's versus medians of 5.0% and 5.8% respectively (with equal per asset SR diversification gets an edge). For me that tiny chance of a higher upside isn't worth the loss I get on average.

Of course over longer time periods, and considering even tinier top percentiles, you would get starker differences. But if your utility function is "I need to make more than X in time T, and if I don't make that number I place zero value on lower wealth" then sure, you would ultimately want to take buy riskier assets, use more leverage if possible, and have a more concentrated portfolio. That is one weird utility function though! It's perhaps a very gen Z influencer view of the world; you need to be rich or risk losing almost all of your money trying, with no other outcome making any sense. It doesn't make sense to this Gen X'er for sure. If your utility function is "I want as much money as possible in expectation (the median), or in the worst 1%, 10%, 25%... percentile outcome" then you should absolutely be diversifying.

The role of forecast error

Now let's assume we don't know the SR. This is more realistic! The way I have dealt with this before is in the context of a backtest where we need to discover the hidden parameters of a distribution that we assume is stable. That doesn't make as much sense here. Instead let's suppose we have a universe of 48 assets, three of which have a higher SR than the others. We don't know for sure which three are special! How special is special? Let's say a SR of 0.5 rather than the ~0.25 we have been assuming. That might not sound much of an improvement but over 20 years that means compounding to a 15x gain rather than a 3.3x gain. 

We begin with the assumption of zero skill. That means we unlikely to pick all 3 good stocks with a portfolio of three, or even just one. Of course with a portfolio of 48 we will always get the 3 good stocks, but their greatness will be diluted by them keeping company with 45 other shitty stocks. Just how shitty? If you set the 45 stocks to have a SR of 0.23, and the three good stocks at 0.5, then the 48 stock portfolio will have an average per stock SR of 0.247. 

We can now generate bazillions of backtests just like before. In each one we pick 3 or 48 stocks from a pool of 48. The results for 48 stocks will be very similar to those from before, since we always end up with the same per stock average or around 0.247. The results for 3 stocks will vary though. The average per asset SR across multiple bootstraps will be 0.247, but it will vary a lot on an individual basis. We have a (3/48)*(2/47)*(1/46) = 0.006% chance of picking three amazing stocks and having a per asset SR of 0.5. There is a (45/48)*(44/47)*(43/46)=82% chance of picking no good stocks and having a per asset SR of 0.23. That isn't the worst of it of course, since we will also have less diversification which will also punish our expected CAGR.

Here are some statistics of the CAGR distribution, running a one year backtest:

                      3 assets                 48 assets   
Median                  4.5%                      5.2%
25% percentile        -11.6%                     -8.6%
99% percentile         85.6%                     72.1%

As you would expect the 48 asset portfolio is superior, except at the very extreme right tail.

Now what happens if we have some skill? We calculate the numbers again using a skill ratio: R. A skill ratio of one means no skill, and just the normal chance of getting a high SR asset on any draw. A skill ratio of two means on our first draw the chance of getting a high SR asset is 2*(45/48) not (45/48). Notice the skill ratio doesn't affect the 48 asset portfolio, since that will always include 45 duffers and 3 special ones.

What skill ratio R is required for the median of the 3 assets to be the same as that for 48 assets? There is no closed form for this, we just have to play around until we get the right number. A skill ratio of 3 works pretty well (these are bootstrapped numbers so the outcome will vary slightly):


                 3 assets with skill R=3        48 assets   
Median                  5.2%                      5.2%
25% percentile        -10.0%                     -8.6%
99% percentile         86.8%                     72.1%

With a skill ratio of 9 we can match the 25% percentile:

                 3 assets with skill R=9        48 assets   
Median                  7.6%                      5.2%
25% percentile         -8.6%                     -8.6%
99% percentile         90.3%                     72.1%

How likely is a skill ratio of 9 in practice? That means our probability of picking one good stock is 56%, when the odds of doing it just by luck are just over 6%. I don't know, that sounds like an astonishing amount of skill to me. Yes some people will pick all three good stocks just by luck -  0.006% of the time, or one in 16,667 people. One of them could even be called Bill. 

The above analysis is with a 0.50 correlation; what would it look like with 0.7?

                      3 assets                 48 assets   
Median                  3.9%                      4.3%
25% percentile        -13.5%                    -12.0%
99% percentile         94.9%                     85.4%

Then with skill, R>1:

                      3 assets R=1.7              3 assets R=4  
Median                   4.3%                        5.5%
25% percentile          -13.3%                     -12.0%
99% percentile           95.0%                      95.1%  

TLDR: For a three asset portfolio to be better 3/4 of the time than a more diversified portfolio, when we don't know for sure which assets have the best SR, we need to be very skilled in picking stocks: between four and nine times better than pure luck. If we are concerned only with the average median outcome, then we 'only' need a skill level around two to three times better than pure luck. 


The role of other uncertainty

At this point I have to stop, since there is no easy way to model the other sources of uncertainty: parameter changes and distributional uncertainty. Suffice to say that in the real world it will be even harder than it is for the toy models above to have sufficient stockpicking skill to overcome the benefits of diversification.


Summary

My conclusions are unchanged - diversification always pays in expectation and at the lower tail of distributions unless you are very, very skilled. But hopefully reading this post has made the reasons why clearer.




Thursday, 6 February 2025

How much should we get paid for skew risk? Not as much as you think!

 A bit of a theme in my posts a few years ago was my 'battle' with the 'classic' trend followers, which can perhaps be summarised as:

Me: Better Sharpe!

Them: Yeah, but Skew!!

My final post on the subject (when I realised it as a futile battle, as we were playing on different fields - me on the field of empirical evidence, them on .... a different field) was this one, in which the key takeaway was this:

The backtest evidence shows that you can achieve a higher maximum CAGR with vol targeting, because it has a large Sharpe Ratio advantage that is only partly offset by it's small skew disadvantage. For lower levels of relative leverage, at more sensible risk targets, vol targeting still has a substantially higher CAGR. The slightly worse skew of vol targeting does not become problematic enough to overcome the SR advantage, except at extremely high levels of risk; well beyond what any sensible person would run.

And another more recent post was on Bitcoin, and why your allocation to it would depend on your appetite for skew. 

With those in mind I recently came to the insight that I could use my framework of 'maximising expected geometric mean / final wealth at different quantile points of the expectation distribution given you can use leverage or not'* to give an intuitive answer an intruiging question - probably one of the core questions in finance:

"What should the price of risk be?"

* or MEGMFWADQPOTED for short - looking actively for a better acronym - which I used in the Bitcoin post linked to above, but explain better in the first half of this post and also this one from a year ago

The whole academic risk factor literature assumes the price of risk often without much reasoning. We can work out the size of the exposure, and the risk of the factor, but that doesn't really justify it's price. After all, academics spent a long time justifying the equity risk premium

I think it would be fun to think about the price of different kinds of risk. Given the background above, I thought only about skew (3rd moment) risk but I will also briefly discuss standard deviation (2nd moment) risk. Generally speaking the idea is to answer the question "What additional Sharpe Ratio should an investor require for each unit of additional risk in the form of X?" Whilst this has certainly been covered by academics at some length, I think the approach of wrapping up into expressing risk preference as optimising for different distributional points is novel and means pretty graphs.

I'm going to assume you're familiar with the idea of maximising geometric return / CAGR / log(final wealth) at some distributional point (50% median or more conservative points like 10, 25%), to find some optimal level of leverage. If not enjoy reading the prior work.


The "price" of standard deviation risk - with and without leverage

To an investor who can use leverage, for Gaussian normal returns, this is trivial. We want the higest Sharpe Ratio asset, irrespective of what it's standard deviation is. Therefore the 'price' of standard deviation is zero. We don't mind getting additional standard deviation risk as long as it doesn't affect our Sharpe Ratio - we don't need a higher SR to compensate. Indeed in practice, we might prefer higher standard deviations since it will require less potential leverage that could be problematic if we are wrong about our SR estimates or assumptions about return distributions.

In classical Markowitz finance to an investor who cannot use leverage, the price of standard deviation is negative. We will happily pay for higher risk in the form of a lower Sharpe Ratio. We want higher returns at all costs; that may come at the cost of higher standard deviation so we aren't fully compensated for the additional risk, but we don't care. This is the 'betting against beta' explanation from the classic Pedersen paper. Consider for example an investment with a mean of 5% and a standard deviation of 10% for a Sharpe Ratio of 0.5 (I set the risk free rate to zero without loss of generality) . If the standard deviation doubles to 20%, but the mean only rises to 6%, well we'd happily take that higher mean. We'd even take it if the mean only increased by 0.00001%. That means the 'price' of higher standard deviation is not only negative, but a very big negative number.

But we are not maximising arithmetic mean. Instead we're maximising geometric mean, which is penalised by higher standard deviation. That means there will be some point at which the higher standard deviation penalty for greater mean is just too high. For the median point on the quantile distribution, which is a full Kelly investor, that will be once the standard deviation has gone above the Kelly optimal level. Until that point the price of risk will be negative; above it will turn positive.

Consider again an arbitrary investment with a mean of 5% and a standard deviation of 10%; SR =0.5. If returns are Gaussian then the geometric mean will be 4.5%. The Kelly optimal risk is much higher 50%, which means it's likely the local price of risk is still negative. So for example, if the standard deviation goes up to 20%, with the mean rising to say 6.5%, for a new (lower) SR of 0.325; we'd still end up with the same geometric mean of 4.5%. In this simple case the price of 10% units of risk is a SR penalty of 0.175; we are willing to pay 0.0175 units of SR for each 1% unit of standard deviation. 

If however the standard deviation goes up another 10%, then the maximum SR penalty for equal geometric mean we would accept is 0.025 units (getting us to a SR of 0.3 or returns of 6.5% a year on 30% standard deviation equating again to a geometric mean of 4.5%); and for any further increase in standard deviation we will have to be payed SR units. This is because the standard deviation is now 30% and so is the SR; we are at the Kelly optimal point. We wouldn't want to take on any additional standard deviation risk unless it is at a higher SR, which will then push the Kelly optimal point upwards.

So we'd need to get paid SR units to push the standard deviation up to say 40%. With 40% standard deviation we'd only be interested in taking the additional risk if we could get a SR of 0.3125 to maintain the geometric mean at 4.5%. Something weird happens here however, since 40% is higher than the new Kelly optimal we can actually get a higher geometric mean if we used less risk (basically by splitting our investment between cash and the new asset). To actually want to use that 40% of risk the SR would trivially have to be 40%. For someone who is remaining fully invested the price of standard deviation risk once you hit the Kelly optimal is going to be 1:1 (1% of standard deviation risk requiring 0.01 of SR benefit).

That is all for a Kelly optimal investor, but how would using my probabilistic methodology with a lower quantile point than the median change this? Well clearly, that would penalise higher standard deviations more, reducing the point at which standard deviation risk was negative.

Because the interaction of leverage and Kelly optimal is complex and will depend on exactly how close the initial asset is to the cutoff point, I'm not going to do more detailed analysis on this as it would be timeconsuming to write, and to read, and not add more intuition thatn the above. Suffice to say there is a reason why I usually assume we can get as much leverage as required!


The "price" of skew - with leverage

Now let's turn to skew (and let's also drop the annoying lack of leverage which makes our life so complicated). The question we now want to answer is "What is the price of skew: how many additional points of SR do we need to compensate us for a unit change in skew, assuming we can freely use leverage? And how does this change at different distributional points?". Returning to the debate that heads this post; is an extra 0.50 units of skew worth a 0.30 drop in SR when we go from continous to 'classical' trend following? We know that would only be the case if we were allowed to use a lot of leverage; which implies we were unlikely to be anything but a full Kelly optimising median distributional point investor. But at what distributional point does that sort of tradeoff become worth it?

To answer this, I'm going to recycle some code from this post and adapt it. That code uses a brute force technique to by mixing Gaussian returns to produce returns with different levels of skewness and fat tailed-ness, but with the same given Sharpe Ratio. We then bootstrap those returns at different leverage levels. That gives us a distribution of returns for each leverage level. We can then choose the optimal leverage that produces the maximum geometric return at a given distributional point (eg median for full Kelly, 10% to be conservative and so on). I then have an expected CAGR level at a given SR, for a given level of skew and fat tailness. By modifying the SR, skew and fat tailness I can see how the geometric return varies, and construct planes where the CAGR is constant. From that I can derive the price of skew (and fat tailness, but I will look at that in a momen) in SR units at different distributional points. Phew!

(Be prepared to set aside many hours of compute time for this exercise if you want to replicate...)


The "price" of skew: Kelly investor

Let's begin by looking at the results for the Kelly maximiser who focuses on the median point of the distribution when calculating their optimal leverage. 

The plots show 'indifference curves' at which the geometric mean is approximately equal. Each coloured line is for a different level of geometric mean. The plots are 'cross plots' that show statistical significance and the median of a cloud of points, as due to the brute force approach there is a cloud of points underneath.

Even then, there is still some non monotonic behaviour. But hopefully the broad message is clear; for this sort of person skew is not worth paying much for! At most we might be willing to give up 4 SR basis points to go from a skew of -3 to +3, which is a pretty massive range.



The "price" of skew: very conservative investor

Now let's consider someone who is working at the 10% quantile point.

If anything these curves are slightly flatter; at most the price of skew might be a couple of basis points. The intuition for this is that these people are working at much lower levels of leverage. They are much less likely to see a penalty from high negative skew, or much of a benefit from a high positive skew.


The "price" of lower tail risk: Kelly investor

Now let's consider the lower tail risk. Remember, a ratio of 1 means we have a Gaussian distribution, and a value above 1 means the left tail is fatter.


This may seem surprising; with a more extreme left tail it looks like you can have a higher SR. But the improvement is modest again, perhaps 5bp of SR at most.


The "price" of lower tail risk: 10% percentile investor

Once again, investors at a lower point on the quantile spectrum are less affected by changes in tail risk, requiring perhaps 3bp of SR in compensation.


How does the optimal leverage / skew relationship change at different percentiles?

As we have the data we can update the plots done earlier and consider how optimal leverage changes with skew. First for the Kelly investor:




Here each coloured line is for a different SR. We can see that for the lowest SR the optimal leverage goes from around 2.7 to 3.7 between the largest negative and positive skews; and for the higest from around 4.2 to 5.6. This is the same result as the last post: leverage can be higher if skew is positive, but not that much higher (from skew of -2 to +2 we can leverage up by around a third).

Here is the 10% investor:




The optimal leverage is lower as you would expect, since we are scaredy cats. It looks like the leverage range is higher though; for the highest SR strategies we go from around 1.7 to 2.8; a two thirds increase. And for the lower SR the rise in optimal leverage is even more dramatic. 


 

One final cut of the data cake

Finally another way to slice the cake is to draw different coloured lines for each level of skew and then see how the geometric mean varies as we change Sharpe Ratio. First the Kelly guy:


This is really reinforcing the point that skew is second order compared to Sharpe Ratio. Each of the bunches of coloured lines is very close to each other. At the very lowest SR at around 0.52 we only get a modest improvement in CAGR going from skew of -2.4 (purple) to +2.4 (red). We get a bigger improvement in CAGR when we add around 3bp of SR and move along the x-axis. Hence 5 units of skew are worth less than 3bp in SR. It's only at relatively high levels of SR that skew becomes more valuable; perhaps 5bp of SR for each 5 units of skew.


Here is the 10% person:


As we noted before there is almost no benefit from skew for the conservative investor (coloured lines close together at each SR point), except until SR ramps up. At the end 5 units of skew are worth the same as around 6bp of SR. 


Conclusion: Skew isn't as valuable as you might think

I started this post harking back to this question: is an extra 0.50 units of skew from 'traditional' trend following worth a 0.30 drop in SR? And the answer is, almost certainly not. The best price we get for skew is around 6bp for 5 units of skew. At that price, 0.5 units of skew should cost us less than 1bp in SR penalty. We're being charged about 50 times the correct price!!!

And this is for Kelly investors. For those with a lower risk tolerance, much of the time there is basically no significant benefit from skew.

That doesn't mean that you shouldn't know what your skew is, as it will affect your optimal leverage, particularly as we saw above if you are a conservative utility person (being such a person will also protect you if you think your skew or Sharpe ratio is better than it actually is, and that's no bad thing). And negatively skewed strategies at la LTCM with very low natural vol that have to be run at insane leverage will always be dangerous, particularly if you don't realise they are negatively skewed. 

But part of the problem with the original debate is a false argument by taking a true statement 'highly negatively skewed strategies are very dangerous with leverage' and extending it to 'you should be happy to suffer significantly lower Sharpe Ratio to get a marginally more positive skew' (which I have demonstrated is false). 

Anyway outside of that argument I think I have shown that to an extent the obsession with getting positive skew is a bit of an unhealthy one. Sure, get it if it's free, but don't pay much for it otherwise. 









Friday, 6 December 2024

Taking an income from your trading account - probabilistic Kelly with regular withdrawals

Programming note: This post has been in draft since ... 2016!

One question you will see me asked a lot is 'how much money do I need to become a full time trader?'. And I usually have a handwaving answer along the lines of 'Well if you think your strategy will earn you 10% a year, then you probably want to be able to cover 5 years of expenses with no income from your trading strategy, so you need 15x your annual living expenses as an absolute minimum'. Which curiously often isn't the answer people want to hear, since objectively at that point they would already be rich and they want to trade purely to become rich (a terrible idea! people should only trade for fun with money they can afford to lose); and also because they want to start trading right now with the $1,000 they have saved up which wouldn't be enough to cover next months rent. 

But behind that slightly trite question there is a more deep and meaningful one. It is a variation of this question, which I've talked about a lot on this blog and in my various books:

"Given an expected distribution of trading strategy returns, what is the appropriate standard deviation or leverage target to run your strategy at?"

And the variation we address here is:

How does the answer to the above question change if you are regularly taking a specific % withdrawal from your account?

This has obvious applications to retail traders like me (although I don't currently take a regular withdrawal from my trading account which is only a proportion of my total investments, rather I sporadically take profits). But it could also have applications to institutional investors creating some kind of structured product with a fixed coupon (do people still do that?).

There is generic python code here (no need to install any of my libraries first, except optionally to use the progressBar function) to follow along with.


A brief reminder of prior art(icles)


For new readers and those with poor memories, here's a quick run through what I mean by 'probabilistic Kelly'. If you are completely new to this and find I'm going too quickly, you might want to read some prior articles:


If you know this stuff backwards, then you can skim through very quickly just to make sure you haven't remembered it wrong.

Here goes then: The best measure of performance is the following - having the most money at the end of your horizon (which for this blogpost I will assume is 10 years, eg around 2,560 working days). We maximise this by maximising final wealth, or log(final wealth). This is known as the Kelly criterion. The amount of money you will have at the end of time is equal to your starting capital C, multiplied by the product of (1+r0)(1+r1)...(1+rT) where rt is the return in a given time period. The t'th root of all of that lot, minus one, is equal to the geometric mean. So to get the most money, we maximise the annual geometric mean of returns which is also known in noob retail trading circles as the CAGR.

If we can use any amount of leverage then for Gaussian returns the optimal standard deviation will be equal to the Sharpe Ratio (i.e. average arithmetic excess return / standard deviation). For example, if we have a strategy with a return of 15%, with risk free rate of 5%, and standard deviation of 20%; then the Sharpe ratio will be (15-5)/20 = 0.50; the optimal standard deviation is 0.50 = 50%; and the leverage required to get that will be 50%/20% = 2.5.

Note: For the rest of the post I'm going to assume Gaussian normal returns since we're interested in the relative effects of what happens when we introduce cash withdrawal, rather than the precise numbers involved. As a general rule if returns are negatively skewed, then this will reduce the optimal leverage and standard deviation target, and hence the safe cash withdrawal rate. 

Enough maths: it's probably easier to look at some pictures. For the arbitrary strategy with the figures above, let's see what happens to return characteristics as we crank up leverage (x-axis; leverage 1 means no leverage and fully invested, >1 means we are applying leverage, <1 means we keep some cash in reserve):

x-axis: leverage, y-axis: various statistics

The raw mean in blue shows the raw effect of applying leverage; doubling leverage doubles the annual mean from 15% to 30%. Similarly doubling leverage doubles the standard deviation in green from 20% to 40%. However when we use leverage we have to borrow money; so the orange line showing the adjusted mean return is lower than the blue line (for leverage >1) as we have to pay interest..

The geometric mean is shown in red. This initially increases, and is highest at 2.5 times leverage - the figure calculated above, before falling. Note that the geometric mean is always less than the mean; and the gap between them gets larger the riskier the strategy gets. They will only be equal if the standard deviation is zero. Note also that using half the optimal leverage doesn't halve the geometric return; it falls to around 14.4% a year down from just over 17.5% a year with the optimal leverage. But doubling the leverage to 5.0 times results in the geometric mean falling to zero (this is a general result). Something to bear in mind then is that using less than the optimal leverage doesn't hurt much, using more hurts a lot.

Here is another plot showing the geometric mean (Left axis, blue) and final account value where initial capital C=1 (right axis, orange); just to confirm the maximum occurs at the same leverage point:

x-axis: leverage, y-axis LHS: geometric mean (blue), y-axis RHS: final account value (orange)

Remember the assumption we're making here is that we can use as much leverage as possible. That means that if we have a typical relative value (stat arb, equity long short, LTCM...) hedge fund with low standard deviation but high Sharpe ratio, then we would need a lot of leverage to hit the optimal point. 

If we label our original asset A, then now consider another asset B with excess mean 10%, standard deviation 10%, and thus Sharpe Ratio of 1.0. For this second asset, assuming it is Gaussian (and assets like this are normally left skewed in reality) the optimal standard deviation will be equal to the SR, 100%; and the leverage required to get that will be 100/10 = 10x. Which is a lot. Here is what happens if we plot the geometric mean against leverage for both assets.



Optimal leverage (x axis) occurs at maximum geometric mean (y axis) which is at leverage 2.5 for A, and at leverage 10 for B (which as you would expect has a much higher geometric mean at that point). 

But if we plot the geometric mean (y axis) against standard deviation (x axis) we can see the optimium risk target is 50% (A) and 100% (B) respectively:

x-axis: leverage, y-axis geometric mean
 

Bringing in uncertainty


Now this would be wonderful except for one small issue; we don't actually know with certainty what our distribution of futures returns will be. If we assume (heroically!) that there is no upward bias in our returns eg because they are from a backtest, and we also assume that the 'data generating process (DGP)' for our returns will not change, and that our statistical model (Gaussian) is appropriate for future returns; then we are still left with the problem that the parameters we are estimating for our returns are subject to sampling estimation error or what I called in my second book 'Smart Portfolios', the "uncertainty of the past".

There are at least three ways to calculate estimation error for something like a Sharpe Ratio, and they are:

  • With a distributional assumption, using a closed form formula eg the variance of the estimate will be (1+.5SR^2)/N where N is the number of observations, if returns are Gaussian. For our 2560 daily returns and an annual SR of 0.5 that will come out to a standard deviation of estimate for the SR of 0.32; eg that would give a 95% confidence interval for annual SR (approx +/- 2 s.d.) of approximately -0.1 to 1.1
  • With non parametric bootstrapping where we sample with replacement from the original time series of returns
  • With parametric monte carlo where we fix some distribution, estimate the distributional parameters from the return series and resample from those distributions
Calculation: annual SR = 0.5, daily SR = 0.5/sqrt(256) = 0.03125. Variance of estimate = (1+.5*.03125^2)/2560 = 0.000391, standard deviation of estimate = 0.0197, annualised = 0.0197*sqrt(256) = 0.32

For simplicity and since I 'know' the parameters of the distribution I'm going to use the third method in this post. 

(it would be equally valid to use the other methods, and I've done so in the past...)

So what we do is generate a number of new return series from the same distribution of returns as in the original strategy, and the same length (10 years). For each of these we calculate the final account value given various leverage levels. We then get a distribution of account values for different leverage levels. 

The full Kelly optimal would just find the leverage level at which the average account value was maximised, i.e. the median 50% percentile point of this distribution. Instead however we're going to take some more conservative distributional point which is something less than 50%, like for example 20%. In plain english, we want the leverage level that maximises the account value that we expect to get say two out of ten times in a future 10 year period (assuming all our assumptions about the distribution are true). 

Note this is a more sophisticated way of doing the crude 'half Kelly' targeting used by certain people, as I've discussed in previous blog posts. It also gives us some comfort in the case of our returns not being normally distributed, but where we've been unable to accurately estimate the likely left hand tail from the existing historic data ('peso problem').

Let's return to asset A and show the final value at different points of the monte carlo distribution, for different leverage levels:


x-axis leverage level, y-axis final value of capital, lines: different percentile points of distribution

Each line is a different point on the distribution, eg 0.5 is the median, 0.2 is the 20% percentile and so on. As we get more pessimistic (lower values of percentile), the final value curve slips down for a given level of leverage; but the optimal leverage which maximizes final value also reduces. If you are super optimistic (75% percentile) you would use 3.5x leverage; but if you were really conservative (10% percentile) you would use about 0.5x leverage (eg keep half your money in cash). 

As I said in my previous post your choice of line is down to your tolerance for uncertainty. This is not quite the same as a risk tolerance, since here we are assuming that you are happy to maximise geometric mean and therefore you are happy to take as much standard deviation risk as that involves. I personally feel that the choice of uncertainty tolerance is much more intuitive to most people than choosing a standard deviation risk limit / target, or god forbid a risk tolerance penalty variable.


Introducing withdrawals


Now we are all caught up with the past, let's have a look at what happens if we withdraw money from our portfolio over time. First decision to make is what our utility function is. Do we still want to maximise final value? Or are we happy to end up with some non positive value of money at the end of time? For some of us, the answer will depend on how much we love our children :-) To keep things simple, I'm initially going to assume that we want to maximise final value, subject to that being at least equal to our starting capital. As my compounding calculations assume an initial wealth of 1.0, that means a final account value of at least 1.0.

Inititally then I'm going to look at what happens in the non probabilistic case. In the following graph, the x-axis is leverage as before, and the y-axis this time is final value. Each of the lines shows what will happen at a different withdrawal rate. 0 is no withdrawal, 0.005 is 0.5% a year, and so on up to 0.2; 20% a year.


x-axis leverage, y-axis final value. Each line is a different annual withdrawal rate

At higher withdrawal rates we make less money - duh! - but the optimal leverage remains unchanged. That makes sense. Regardless of how much money we are withdrawing, we're going to want to run at the same optimal amount of leverage. 

And for all withdrawal rates of 17% or less, we end up with at least 1.0 of our final account value, so we can use the optimal leverage without any worries. For higher withdrawal rates, eg 20%, we can never safely withdraw all that amount, regardless of how much leverage we use. We'll always end up with less than our final account value even at the optimal leverage ratio.

For this Sharpe Ratio level then, to end up with at least 1.0 of our account value, it looks like our safe withdrawal rate is around 17% (In fact, I calculate it later to be more like 18%).


Safe withdrawals versus Sharpe Ratio


OK that's for a Sharpe of 0.5, but what if we have a strategy which is much better or worse? What is the relationship between a safe withdrawal rate, and the Sharpe Ratio of the underlying strategy?  Let's assume that we want to end up with at least 1.0x our starting capital after 10 years, and we push our withdrawal rate up to that point. 

X-axis Sharpe Ratio, y-axis safe withdrawal rate leaving capital unchanged at starting level

That looks a bit exponential-esque, which kind of makes sense since we know that returns gross of funding costs scale with the square of SR: If our returns double with the same standard deviation we double our SR, then we can double our risk target, which means we can use twice as much leverage, so we end up with four times the return. It isn't exactly exponential, because we have to fund borrowing. 

The above result is indifferent to the standard deviation of the underlying asset as we'd expect (I did check!), but how does it vary when we change the other key values in our calculation: the years to run the strategy over and the proportion of our starting capital we want to end up with?

x-axis amount of starting capital to end up with, y-axis withdrawal rate, lines different time periods in years

Each of these plots has the same format. The Sharpe Ratio of the underlying strategy is fixed, and is in the title. The y-axis shows the safe withdrawal rate, for a given amount of remaining starting capital on the x-axis (where 1.0 means we want to end up with all our remaining capital). Each line shows the results for a different number of years.

The first thing to notice is that if we want to maintain our starting capital, the withdrawal rate will be unchanged regardless of the number of years we are trading for. That makes sense - this is a 'steady state' where we are withdrawing exactly what we make each year. If we are happy to end up with less of our capital, then with shorter horizons we can afford to take a lot more out of our account each year. Again, this makes sense. However if we want to end up with more money than we started with, and our horizon is short, then we have to take less out to let everything compound up. In fact for a short enough time horizon we can't end up with twice our capital as there just isn't enough time to compound up (at what here is quite a poor Sharpe Ratio). 

x-axis amount of starting capital to end up with, y-axis withdrawal rate, lines different time periods in years


With a higher Sharpe, the pattern is similar but the withdrawal rates that are possible are much larger. 


x-axis amount of starting capital to end up with, y-axis withdrawal rate, lines different time periods in years



Withdrawals probabilistically


Notice that if you really are going to consistently hit a SR of exactly 1, and you're prepared to run at full Kelly, then a very high withdrawal rate of 50% is apparently possible. But hitting a SR of exactly 1 is unlikely because of parameter uncertainty. 

So let's see what happens if we introduce the idea of distributional monte carlo into withdrawals. To keep things simple, I'm going to stick my original goal of saying that we want to end up with exactly 100% of our capital remaining when we finish. That means we can solve the problem for an arbitrary number of years (I'm going to use 30, which seems reasonable for someone in the withdrawal phase of their investment career post retirement). 

What I'm going to do then is generate a large number of random 30 year daily return series drawn for a return distribution appropriate for a given Sharpe Ratio, and for each of those calculate what the optimal leverage would be (which remember from earlier is invariant to withdrawal rate), and then find the maximum annual withdrawal rate that means I still have my starting capital at the end of the investment period. This will give me a distribution of withdrawal rates. 

From that distribution I then take a different quantile point, depending on whether I am being optimistic or pessimistic versus the median.



X-axis: Sharpe Ratio. Y-axis: withdrawal rate (where 0.5 is 50% a year). Line colours: different percentiles of the monte carlo withdrawal rate distribution, eg 0.5 is the median, 0.1 is the very conservative 10% percentile.


Here is the same data in a table:

                   Percentile
SR     0.10   0.20   0.30   0.50    0.75
0.10 4.7 4.8 4.9 5.5 7.40
0.25 4.9 5.3 6.0 7.9 11.00
0.50 9.0 11.0 13.0 18.0 24.25
0.75 18.0 23.0 26.0 33.0 43.00
1.00 33.0 39.0 45.0 55.0 66.00
1.50 83.9 96.0 102.0 117.0 135.00
2.00 162.0 176.0 185.7 205.0 228.25

We can see our old friend 18% in the median 0.50 percentile column, for the 0.50 SR row. As before we can withdraw more with higher Sharpe Ratios.
Now though as you would expect, as we get more optimistic about the quanti, we would use a higher withdrawal rate. For example, for a SR of 1.0 the withdrawal rates vary from 33% a year at the very conservative 10% percentile, right up to 66% at the highly optimistic 75% percentile.
As I've discussed before nobody should ever use more than the median 50% (penultimate column) which means you're basically indifferent to uncertainty, and I'd be vary wary of the bottom few rows with very high  Sharpe Ratios, unless you're actually running an HFT shop or Jane Street in which case good luck.
Footnote: All of the above numbers were calculated with a 5% risk free rate. Here are the same figures with a 0% risk free rate. They are roughly, but not exactly, the above minus 5%. This means that for low enough SR values and percentile points we can't safely withdraw anything and expect to end up with our starting capital intact.

                    Percentile
SR     0.10   0.20   0.30   0.50   0.75
0.10 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 2.8
0.25 0.0 0.6 1.4 3.6 7.5
0.50 3.6 5.9 8.1 12.0 19.0
0.75 13.0 17.0 21.0 28.0 38.0
1.00 29.0 34.0 39.0 48.0 62.0
1.50 79.0 90.0 96.0 110.0 131.0
2.00 150.9 167.0 178.0 198.5 223.0



Conclusion



I find him strangely compelling and also very annoying. He is always sniggering and has a permanent smug look on his face. The videos are mostly set in exotic places where we are presumably supposed to envy Anton's lifestyle which seems to involve spending a lot of time flying around the world - not something I'd personally aspire to.

t

I can't comment on the quality of his education but at least he has the pedigree. He also has some interesting opinions about non trading subjects but then so do most trading "gurus". Mostly on trading, and on the financial industry generally, from what I've seen he talks mostly sense.

Anyway, one interesting thing he said is that you shouldn't use trading for income but only to grow capital. Something I mostly agree with. Mostly people who w

http://www.elitetrader.com/et/index.php?threads/how-much-did-you-save-up-before-you-decided-to-trade-full-time.298251/
As a procrastination technique (I'm supposed to be writing my second book) I've been watching the videos of Anton Kriel on youtube. For those of you who don't know him he's an english ex goldman sachs guy who retired at the age of 27, "starred" in the post modern turtle traders based reality trading show "million dollar traders", and now runs something called the institute of trading that offers very high priced training and mentoring courses.

I find him strangely compelling and also very annoying. He is always sniggering and has a permanent smug look on his face. The videos are mostly set in exotic places where we are presumably supposed to envy Anton's lifestyle which seems to involve spending a lot of time flying around the world - not something I'd personally aspire to.

I can't comment on the quality of his education but at least he has the pedigree. He also has some interesting opinions about non trading subjects but then so do most trading "gurus". Mostly on trading, and on the financial industry generally, from what I've seen he talks mostly sense.

Anyway, one interesting thing he said is that you shouldn't use trading for income but only to grow capital. Something I mostly agree with. Mostly people who w

http://www.elitetrader.com/et/index.php?threads/how-much-did-you-save-up-before-you-decided-to-trade-full-time.298251/
I'd quite a conservative person, so I'd probably conservatively assume my SR was around 0.50 (in backtest it's much higher than that, and even in live trading it's been a little bit higher), and use the most conservative 10% percentile. That implies that with a withdrawal rate a shade under 4% plus the risk free rate I'd still have my starting capital intact after any given period of time. 

Since I've used a risk free rate of 5%, that implies withdrawing the risk free rate plus another 4% on top, for a total of 9%.

If you're more aggressive, and have good reason to expect a higher Sharpe Ratio, then you could consider a withdrawal rate up to perhaps 30%. But this should only be done by someone with a track record of achieving those kinds of returns over several years, and who is comfortable with the fact that their chances of maintaining their capital are only a coin flip.

Note that one reason this is quite low is that in a conservative 10% quantile scenario I'd rarely be using the full Kelly (remember 0.50 SR implies a 50% risk target); this is consistent with what I actually do which is use a 25% risk target. With a 25% risk target, and SR 0.5 in theory I will make the risk free rate plus 12.5%. So I'm withdrawing around a third of my expected profits, which sounds like a good rule of thumb for someone who is relatively risk averse. 

Obviously my conservative 9% is higher than the 4% suggested by most retirement planners (which is a bit arbitrary as it doesn't seem to change when the risk free rate changes), but that is for long only portfolios where the Sharpe probably won't be even as good as 0.50; and more importantly where leverage isn't possible. Getting even to the half Kelly risk target of 25% isn't going to be possible without leverage with a portfolio that doesn't just contain small cap stocks or crypto.... it will be impossible with 60:40 for sure! But also bear in mind that my starting capital won't be worth what it's currently worth in real terms in the future, so I might want to reduce that figure further.